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A SEPARATION OF POWERS ANALYSIS
OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS’
ADEQUATE AVAILABLE FORUM
JASON S. PALMER†
The general doctrine of our Constitution then is, that the
executive power of the nation is vested in the president,
subject only to the exceptions and qualifications, which are
expressed in the instrument.1
– Alexander Hamilton

INTRODUCTION
“Boehner snubs [White House], invites Netanyahu to address
Congress.”2 These words, or words remarkably similar, headlined
newspapers all around the United States on January 21, 2015.3
Without consulting President Obama, House Speaker John
Boehner invited Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu to
address a joint session of Congress in opposition to the White
House’s overtures to Iran with respect to its nuclear program.4
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1
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, PACIFICUS NO. 1 (June 29, 1793), reprinted in 7 THE
WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 76, 81 (John C. Hamilton ed., 1851).
2
Susan Davis, Boehner Snubs WH, Invites Netanyahu To Address Congress,
USA TODAY (Jan. 22, 2015, 7:09 AM), http://usat.ly/1JeZq5d [https://perma.cc/XY922TZ5].
3
See, e.g., id.
4
Id. Speaker Boehner, in a statement regarding the invitation, stated, “I am
asking the prime minister to address Congress on the grave threats radical Islam
and Iran pose to our security and way of life.” See Jake Miller, Boehner Invites
Benjamin Netanyahu To Address Congress, CBS NEWS (Jan. 21, 2015, 4:40 PM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/john-boehner-invites-israeli-prime-minister-benjaminnetanyahu-to-address-congress/ [https://perma.cc/BD57-W8LJ].
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Speaker Boehner extended the invitation in apparent response to
President Obama’s State of the Union Address, in which he informed Congress that any further economic sanctions bill against
Iran at that time would be detrimental to ongoing diplomatic
negotiations and would be vetoed.5 Prime Minister Netanyahu
accepted the offer and addressed a joint session of Congress.6
Questions were immediately raised about the unprecedented
breach of diplomatic protocol, as invitations to foreign leaders to
address Congress are usually made in consultation with the White
House and State Department.7 Some went so far as to question
whether the invitation was unconstitutional.8 According to Article
II, Section 3, of the United States Constitution, the President of
the United States “shall receive Ambassadors and other public
Ministers” from foreign governments.9 Critics of the invitation
argued that Prime Minister Netanyahu, appearing as the official
representative of his country, should be classified as a “public
minister.” According to Stanford University Professor Jack Rakove,
the Founding Fathers empowered the President with this role for
a specific reason—to facilitate negotiations with foreign powers
regarding complex issues on behalf of the United States.10 In this
regard, while Congress is tasked with declaring war,11 “the
[P]resident is charged with making peace—and ‘peace [was] attended with intricate and secret negotiations.’ ”12 This decision,
enshrined in the Constitution, demonstrated the Founding
Fathers’ desire to have the President in charge of “delicate”
negotiations with foreign governments that required discretion.13
While Boehner’s invitation to Netanyahu did not precipitate a
constitutional crisis, it did raise the question of which branch of
5

Miller, supra note 4.
The Complete Transcript of Netanyahu’s Address to Congress, WASH. POST
(Mar. 3, 2015, 12:01 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/
03/03/full-text-netanyahus-address-to-congress/ [https://perma.cc/Q36F-5ZAN].
7
See Davis, supra note 2.
8
See, e.g., Elizabeth Cobbs, Why Boehner’s Invite to Netanyahu Is Unconstitutional, REUTERS (Mar. 2, 2015), http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2015/03/01/
netanyahu-invite-is-a-symptom-of-boehners-grudge-match-against-the-u-s-constitution/
[https://perma.cc/LK4B-B2AV].
9
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
10
JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING
OF THE CONSTITUTION 267 (1996) (“Familiar as the [F]ramers were with these episodes, they could readily appreciate the diplomatic and political advantages of
allowing the [P]resident a significant initiative in the conduct of foreign relations.”).
11
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
12
Cobbs, supra note 8 (alteration in original).
13
Id.
6
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government, the executive or the legislative, should control this
important aspect of foreign policy.14
Discussions of the separation of powers principle often focus
on the relationship and power struggle between the executive and
legislative branches of the United States federal government as
evidenced by the dichotomous power struggle over the Netanyahu
invitation. Some separation of powers arguments target overreaching by a zealous Executive whom the legislative branch
wants to reign in and control. Or they involve a strong and dominant Congress that overrides and ignores a perceived weaker
President. At other times, separation of powers discussions may
focus on how the judiciary and the Executive interact and decide
issues that touch upon foreign policy or political questions.
Harold Koh, the former Legal Adviser at the United States
Department of State, in discussing separation of powers doctrine,
stated that “the Founding Fathers framed the constitutional
provisions on foreign affairs with two goals in mind—to fashion a
stronger national government while holding each branch of that
government accountable to the others through a strong system of
checks and balances.”15
In evaluating the role of separation of powers, the Executive
is often perceived as having significant independent power in the
area of foreign relations, while courts have a limited role in
matters that implicate foreign affairs. But from where exactly
does the Executive’s foreign affairs power derive? Some argue
this foreign affairs power arises from the inherent concepts of
nationality and sovereignty under international law. Others
argue that the Executive’s foreign affairs powers derive either
explicitly or implicitly from Article II of the United States
Constitution. While the Constitution is actually silent on the
exact role of the Executive with regard to the international
arena, Koh opined that when evaluating the role of the Executive
14
Likewise, in March 2015, Senator Tom Cotton and forty-six other Republican
members of Congress wrote an “open letter” to the leaders of the Islamic Republic of
Iran with the intent of advising them regarding United States constitutional law
relating to international agreement making. Press Release, Tom Cotton, Senator, State
of Arkansas, Cotton and 46 Fellow Senators to Send Open Letter to the Leaders of
the Islamic Republic of Iran (Mar. 9, 2015), https://www.cotton.senate.gov/?p=
press_release&id=120 [https://perma.cc/FM96-FHGX]. This letter was an undisguised
attempt to undercut the Obama administration’s ability to negotiate regarding
nuclear disarmament with the Iranian government, and thus was an unprecedented
attack on the Executive’s power to negotiate with foreign nations.
15
HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING
POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 74–75 (1990).
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with respect to foreign affairs, one should look to a “normative
vision of the foreign policy-making process” that “lurks within
our constitutional system.”16 While the Executive should not
have unbridled control over foreign affairs, great deference and
respect should be accorded to the political aspects surrounding
foreign policy determinations. While no foreign affairs clause
exists in the Constitution, executive powers derived from the
Constitution include “the important foreign affairs powers
encompassing a nation’s relationship with those outside it—
principally, diplomatic and military powers.”17 Further, according
to Professor Michael Ramsey, a textual basis in the Constitution
exists for the Executive’s foreign affairs powers.18 Article II,
Section 1, of the Constitution states that the President has the
“executive Power” of the United States.19 While this clause might
not seem to discuss foreign affairs, Professor Ramsey states, “it
was associated with foreign affairs in eighteenth-century uses of
the term.”20 With this understanding of Article II, Section 1, in
mind, limits were designed regarding the President’s “executive
Power.” Checks and balances were developed to moderate these
powers. Even so, despite the checks and balances achieved through
separation of powers as understood from the Constitution, courts
are not “in charge of foreign affairs” and should not “undertake
foreign affairs policymaking.”21 These principles should have important implications for how the courts are addressing forum non
conveniens analyses, especially with respect to adequate alternative forum.
Forum non conveniens, a common law doctrine, was initially
developed to protect foreign defendants from being forced to
litigate claims in forums that were unreasonable, despite the
preference to allow plaintiffs the right to choose where and how
to litigate their claims. The Supreme Court of the United States
gave weight to the doctrine of forum non conveniens in Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Gilbert,22 which it further clarified in Piper Aircraft Co.
v. Reyno.23 The forum non conveniens doctrine, as established by
the Supreme Court in Gulf Oil Corp., developed as a preventive
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

Id. at 68.
MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 5 (2007).
Id. at 52.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
RAMSEY, supra note 17, at 52 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 7.
330 U.S. 501, 508–09 (1947).
454 U.S. 235, 248–50, 257 (1981).
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to plaintiffs’ choosing a forum designed solely to harass a defendant, and was expanded in Piper Aircraft to prevent forum
shopping by foreign plaintiffs who wished to litigate in United
States courts.24 While the Supreme Court recognized that deference may be accorded to domestic plaintiffs and their choice of
forum, less deference was given to foreign plaintiffs suing in a
United States court.25 Yet, even before this determination is made,
the federal court is required to assess whether an adequate
alternative forum exists in which the plaintiff may bring suit.
Thus, the first question a court must address in any forum
non conveniens analysis is how to determine if an alternate
forum is available to a plaintiff that justifies granting a motion to
dismiss based on forum non conveniens. By mandating that an
alternative forum be adequate, the Supreme Court implicitly
recognized that a forum non conveniens dismissal may not
prevent the plaintiffs from having their day in court. The
Supreme Court in Piper Aircraft, however, fashioned a rather
incomplete test for the lower courts with regard to an adequate
alternative forum by stating that a forum is ordinarily available
when “the defendant is ‘amenable to process’ in the other
jurisdiction.”26 The Court then obfuscated the point by following
up with the statement that this rule was not absolute:
[W]here the remedy offered by the other forum is clearly
unsatisfactory, the other forum may not be an adequate
alternative, and the initial requirement may not be satisfied.
Thus, for example, dismissal would not be appropriate where
the alternative forum does not permit litigation of the subject
matter of the dispute.27

Unfortunately for plaintiffs attempting to invoke forum non
conveniens, the Supreme Court, in its limited analysis of adequate
available forum, failed to distinguish between an inadequate forum and an inadequate remedy. Does this gap in the analysis
mean that an inadequate remedy makes the forum inadequate?
Or is it inadequate only when there is no remedy at all? Or when
the litigation cannot occur at all? Further, the Supreme Court
failed to address other factors that might impact the adequacy of
the alternative forum, such as the lack of sufficient procedural
process or the fundamental fairness of the court system in the
24
25
26
27

Gulf Oil Corp., 330 U.S. at 507; Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 251–52.
Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 255–56.
Id. at 254 n.22.
Id.
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other forum. The result of the Supreme Court’s vague policy position has been that lower courts and commentators have applied
a variety of methods and tests to evaluate the adequacy of an
available forum.
According to Joel Samuels in his article, “When Is an
Alternative Forum Available? Rethinking the Forum Non
Conveniens Analysis,” a new test is required to decide how and
when judges should apply the alternate available forum
determination.28 In his article, Samuels proceeds to lay out a
six-factor test for the judiciary to use in its evaluation of whether
the alternate forum is truly available.29 In order to qualify as an
alternative forum, Samuels suggests looking at the alternative
forum with respect to “jurisdiction, meaningful remedy, fair
treatment of parties, access to the courts, procedural due process,
and stability of the forum.”30 However, Samuels’ argument, while
cogent and correct, does not go far enough. While his factors test
provides additional resources for the decision on an available
forum, the wrong entity is interpreting those factors. The judiciary is not the optimal branch for reviewing whether an
alternative available forum exists.
While not taking a position on whether these factors represent the universe of potentiality with respect to qualifications for
an alternate available forum, this Article advocates that the
executive branch is uniquely positioned to review these factors
and provide an opinion to the courts on whether the alternate
forum is indeed an adequate one. Before reaching this discussion, Part I of this Article introduces forum non conveniens
through the Supreme Court’s rulings in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert31
and Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno.32 Once the foundations for forum
non conveniens are established, Part II of this Article turns to a
survey of cases that have been decided on the basis of whether an
adequate available forum existed or not. At the core of the Article’s analysis of adequate available forum, Part III specifically
analyzes lower court decisions assessing the adequacy of an
alternative forum by categorizing these decisions either as ones
that focus on the alternative forum’s judicial capacity or upon
28
Joel H. Samuels, When Is an Alternative Forum Available? Rethinking the
Forum Non Conveniens Analysis, 85 IND. L.J. 1059, 1081 (2010).
29
Id. at 1061.
30
Id. at 1081.
31
330 U.S. 501 (1947).
32
454 U.S. 235 (1981).
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factors that impact international relations and how these categorizations implicate separation of powers. Part IV of the Article
then explains the separation of powers doctrine through original
understanding, historical practice, and constitutional structure.
Finally, Part V demonstrates why, from a separation of powers
perspective, courts should defer to the Executive in determining
an adequate alternative forum when the case implicates
international relations.
I. “IN THE BEGINNING”—THE DEVELOPMENT
OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS
The Supreme Court in Gulf Oil v. Gilbert made its first foray
into developing a federal standard for forum non conveniens by
adopting a doctrine intended solely to prevent plaintiffs from
choosing a forum for the exclusive purpose of harassing the defendant.33 The Court stated that the plaintiff was not allowed to
choose a forum that would “ ‘vex,’ ‘harass,’ or ‘oppress’ the defendant by inflicting upon him expense or trouble not necessary to
[the plaintiff’s] own right to pursue his remedy.”34
The parties in Gulf Oil were both United States citizens, and
the jurisprudence as set forth by the Supreme Court was
designed to prevent what the Court perceived as injustice to the
defendant. The plaintiff in Gulf Oil operated a warehouse in
Lynchburg, Virginia, where he lived.35 The defendant, Gulf Oil, a
Pennsylvania corporation, qualified to do business in both
Virginia and New York, was alleged to have negligently delivered
a shipment of gasoline to the plaintiff’s warehouse and its
pumps.36 This shipment exploded and destroyed the plaintiff’s
warehouse.37 Plaintiff initiated his lawsuit in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York, and the
defendant moved to dismiss the action to Virginia based on the
doctrine of forum non conveniens.38 The Southern District of New
York agreed with the defendant and dismissed the case to
Virginia.39 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second

33
34
35
36
37
38
39

330 U.S. at 507–09.
Id. at 508.
Id. at 502.
Id. at 502–03.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 503.

164

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94:157

Circuit disagreed and reversed.40 The Supreme Court agreed
with the district court’s order granting the forum non conveniens
request transferring the case from New York to Virginia.41
In reaching its conclusion, the Supreme Court based its determination on a careful balancing of both private and public
interest factors. Private interest factors weighed by the court
included
the relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of
compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of
obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of
premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all
other practical problems that make trial of a case easy,
expeditious and inexpensive.42

The court may also account for the “enforcibility [sic] of a
judgment” and the “relative advantages and obstacles to fair
trial.”43 Public interest factors that the court will balance are
“[a]dministrative difficulties” that arise from “congested” court
dockets, “[j]ury duty” for individuals who do not have any
“relation to the litigation,” “local interest[s] in having controversies decided” in the home forum, and questions of which law
will govern.44 Prior to weighing the private and public factors,
the court explained that unless the “balance is strongly in favor
of the defendant,” the plaintiff’s choice of forum should be given
great deference.45 Additionally, the Court implicitly assumed the
adequacy of the alternative forum by stating that a forum non
conveniens analysis “presupposes at least two forums in which
the defendant is amenable to process.”46 In Gulf Oil, the alternate available forum was either a state or federal court in
Virginia, where the defendant was amenable to process; as a
result the Supreme Court did not engage in an analysis of this
issue.47
As both forums in Gulf Oil were in the United States, the
Supreme Court simply assumed the adequacy of either forum.48
One year later, judicial application of forum non conveniens with re40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

Id.
Id. at 512.
Id. at 508.
Id.
Id. at 508–09.
Id. at 508.
Id. at 507.
Id. at 503.
Id. at 506–07.
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spect to dismissal from one federal court to another federal court
became a non-issue with the enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a),
which allowed cases to be transferred from one federal district to
another, provided that both forums had proper jurisdiction and
venue.49 Since this statute involved the transfer of a case from
one district court to another, by virtue of its application, it was
unnecessary to address whether the transferee court was an
adequate available forum. It was not until thirty-four years later
that the Supreme Court addressed the issue of the adequacy of
an available forum with respect to dismissal to a foreign court in
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno.50
In Piper Aircraft, the Supreme Court elucidated the modern
application of forum non conveniens that courts are still applying
today. Piper Aircraft involved a wrongful death action that arose
from an airplane crash in Scotland that resulted in the death of
several Scottish citizens.51 Reyno, the legal secretary of the attorney representing the plaintiffs who was appointed the representative of the Scottish decedents’ estates, filed wrongful
death litigation on behalf of the five decedents in California state
court.52 The defendants, Piper Aircraft Co. and Hartzell Propeller, Inc., were a Pennsylvania company that manufactured the
plane and an Ohio company that manufactured the plane’s
propellers.53 When the crash occurred, the plane was registered
in Great Britain and was owned and operated by United
Kingdom companies.54 The defendants successfully removed the
action to the United States District Court for the Central District
of California and then, utilizing 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), transferred
the case to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.55 After transferring to the Middle District
of Pennsylvania, the defendants argued that the case should be
dismissed to Scotland on the grounds of forum non conveniens.56
Applying the private and public factors expounded in Gulf Oil
Co. v. Gilbert, the district court granted the motion to dismiss.57
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit re49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57

28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2018).
454 U.S. 235, 238 (1981).
Id. at 238–40.
Id. at 239–40.
Id. at 239.
Id.
Id. at 240.
Id. at 241.
Id.
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versed the district court based partly on its analysis of adequacy
of Scotland as an alternative forum.58 Specifically, the Third
Circuit determined that Scotland would not be an adequate
forum because the law of the transferee forum would be less
favorable to the plaintiff.59
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and
granted dismissal based on forum non conveniens.60 In reaching
its decision, the Court “shifted and enlarged the Gilbert standard
from simply preventing vexation or harassment to also include
preventing forum shopping.”61 While the Court agreed that the
first step in a forum non conveniens analysis was whether an
adequate available forum existed, it took issue with the Third
Circuit’s formulation of the adequacy test. The Court stated:
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that plaintiffs may
defeat a motion to dismiss on the ground of forum non
conveniens merely by showing that the substantive law that
would be applied in the alternative forum is less favorable to
the plaintiffs than that of the present forum. The possibility of
a change in substantive law should ordinarily not be given
conclusive or even substantial weight in the forum non
conveniens inquiry.62

The Court, however, then placed a caveat on its decision by
indicating that unfavorable substantive law may be a relevant
consideration, stating that “if the remedy provided by the
alternative forum is so clearly inadequate or unsatisfactory that
it is no remedy at all, the unfavorable change in law may be
given substantial weight.”63
According to the Piper Court, an alternative forum is deemed
available as long as the defendant is “amenable to [service of]
process,” except in “rare circumstances” when “the remedy offered by the other forum is clearly unsatisfactory.”64 While the
possible damages that plaintiffs could recover in Scotland was far
less than what was available in the United States, this difference
did not render Scotland an inadequate forum.65 Less favorable
58

Id. at 244–45.
Id. at 244.
60
Id. at 247, 261.
61
Megan Walpes, Note, The Adequate Alternative Forum Analysis in Forum Non
Conveniens: A Case for Reform, 36 CONN. L. REV. 1475, 1482 (2004).
62
Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 247.
63
Id. at 254.
64
Id. at 254 n.22.
65
Id. at 254–55.
59
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did not mean less adequate. The Supreme Court’s formulation of
adequacy of an available forum, however, failed to distinguish between an inadequate forum and an inadequate remedy. Rather,
the Court seems to imply that the one equates with the other.
[W]here the remedy offered by the other forum is clearly
unsatisfactory, the other forum may not be an adequate alternative, and the initial requirement may not be satisfied. Thus,
for example, dismissal would not be appropriate where the
alternative forum does not permit litigation of the subject
matter in dispute.66

This approach is quite dissatisfying. It equates a question of
law that is suited to determination by the courts, that is, whether
the remedy is adequate, with a question of foreign policy, that is,
whether the very forum itself is adequate—a question that implicates executive power and is best left in the hands of the
Executive to decide. Further, in reaching its decision, the Court
failed to directly address “procedural safeguards, practical considerations, or concerns regarding the fundamental fairness of
the court.”67 The Supreme Court’s failure to address these critical components regarding an adequate available forum has
allowed federal courts to take inconsistent and divergent
positions on what constitutes an adequate foreign forum, how to
appropriately address the actual procedural and practical weaknesses in dismissing cases to foreign forums, and how to address
the competency or impartiality of a foreign court. Lower courts
that have attempted to answer these questions in their adequate
available forum analyses have focused their analyses on either
the forum’s inherent judicial ability or upon international
relations and foreign policy considerations—a dichotomy that
implicates and begs for a separation of powers analysis. In order
to further explicate this point, representative lower courts’
discussions of adequate available forums will now be explained
and analyzed.

66
Id. at 254 n.22. Once the Supreme Court determined that an adequate
available forum existed, it then decided that “a foreign plaintiff’s choice [of forum]
deserves less deference” than the deference provided to United States plaintiffs who
are litigating in federal courts. Id. at 256. The Court then reviewed the private
interests and the public interests as set forth originally in Gilbert, holding that the
balance of interests favored the defendants, and dismissed the case to Scotland. Id.
at 257.
67
Walpes, supra note 61, at 1484.
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II. LITTLE RHYME OR REASON—FEDERAL COURTS
AND ADEQUATE AVAILABLE FORUM ANALYSES
Analyzing forum non conveniens with respect to a determination of an adequate available forum presents several challenges,
not the least of which is the lack of reported decisions. Additionally, according to Joel Samuels, who reviewed 1,447 forum non
conveniens cases for his 2010 article, courts conducted adequate
available forum analyses in only 999 of those cases—which is
sixty-nine percent—even though, according to the dictates of
Piper Aircraft, such an analysis should be required in one
hundred percent of the cases.68 Further, based on the Piper
Aircraft decision, some courts have viewed the determination on
the adequacy of the available forum as a low threshold.69 With
these points in mind, this Section will review forum non
conveniens cases, not to be a comprehensive analysis of the topic,
but rather to demonstrate the difficulties and inconsistencies
involved in federal courts attempting to apply a standard for
adequate available forum.
Many courts simply bypass the adequate available forum
analysis by assuming or merely stating that the forum is “adequate”
without any analysis of the issue whatsoever. For instance, in
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., the court
decided that Canada was an adequate forum to determine plaintiffs’ claims of genocide, specifically stating that it “assume[d],
without deciding, that plaintiffs would be able to receive a fair
trial in Canada, notwithstanding the fact that Talisman is a Canadian company.”70 Instead of requiring the defendant to demonstrate that Canada was an adequate forum, the court relied on
the fact that the plaintiffs failed to challenge the adequacy of
Canada as an adequate available forum, which effectively shifted
the burden of proof on this issue to the plaintiffs.71 Likewise, in
State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Inversiones Errazuriz, Limitada,
the plaintiffs sought recovery of “over $100 million pursuant to
68

Samuels, supra note 28, at 1077.
See, e.g., Princeton Football Partners LLC v. Football Ass’n of Ir., No. 11-5227,
2012 WL 2995199, at *4 (D.N.J. Jul. 23, 2012) (citing Tech. Dev. Co. v. Onischenko,
174 F. App’x 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Inadequacy of the alternative forum is rarely a
barrier to forum non conveniens dismissal.”)).
70
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289,
336–37 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), aff’d, 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009).
71
Id. at 337–38; see also, e.g., Int’l Equity Invs., Inc. v. Cico, 427 F. Supp. 2d
503, 505 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (stating that “the Court assumes that Brazil provides an
adequate alternative forum”).
69
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two Credit Agreements.”72 After settlement talks failed and the
plaintiff filed and received a default judgment, the defendants appeared to challenge the default judgment and to assert defenses,
including forum non conveniens.73 In reviewing the forum non
conveniens claim, the court recognized that the inquiry was a
two-step process, with the “first step” being “to determine if an
adequate available forum exists.”74 However, the court failed to
engage in such an analysis, but rather, relied on the fact that the
“plaintiff [did] not challenge the adequacy of the alternative
forum in Chile,” which abrogated its responsibility to engage in a
rigorous analysis of this critical first step in a forum non
conveniens analysis.75 Conversely, in Technology Development Co.
v. Onischenko, the Third Circuit reversed the district court,
stating that a more exacting analysis of adequate available forum
is necessary prior to dismissal.76 “[T]he District Court should
have done more than simply conclude that Russia provides an
adequate forum without any discussion whatsoever of the remedies available in Russia or any citation to cases supporting the
view that the Russian courts are adequate to handle disputes of
this nature.”77
When federal courts provide any analysis of forum non
conveniens, without any explicit guidance from the Supreme
Court, they often focus on myriad factors. Some courts will look
to the defendant’s amenability to process in the other forum, and,
provided that this requirement is met, will find that the alternative forum is adequate. A corollary to this position is to consider
certain procedural issues within the analysis of adequate
available forum. These procedural safeguards, when analyzed,
often will not render a foreign forum inadequate. Some courts in
their adequate available forum analyses look at the “soundness
and procedural fairness of that society’s court system.”78 In Flynn
v. General Motors, Inc., the defendant asserted that Trinidad and
72
State St. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Inversiones Errazuriz, Limitada, 230 F. Supp. 2d
313, 315 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
73
Id. at 315–16, 319.
74
Id. at 319.
75
Id.; see also, e.g., DR Music, Inc. v. Aramini Strumenti Musicali S.R.L., No.
13-7028, 2014 WL 523042, at *4 (D.N.J. Feb. 7, 2014) (finding that “it appears that
there is an alternative forum, i.e. the Italian courts” because the defendant indicated
that it was amenable to process in Italy).
76
Tech. Dev. Co. v. Onischenko, 174 F. App’x 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2006).
77
Id.
78
Flynn v. Gen. Motors, Inc., 141 F.R.D. 5, 8 (E.D.N.Y 1992) (quoting Murty v.
Aga Khan, 92 F.R.D. 478, 482 (E.D.N.Y. 1981)).
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Tobago was an adequate forum as its court system would allow
the plaintiff an opportunity to be heard and could provide a
remedy for the injuries suffered due to the defective products.79
The plaintiffs conversely argued that Trinidad and Tobago was
an inadequate forum, relying on the position that Trinidad and
Tobago’s court system did not “provide jury trials in civil cases.”80
The court determined Trinidad and Tobago was an adequate
forum as “Plaintiff ha[d] failed to show that the Trinidad and
Tobago judicial system lack[ed] appropriate procedural safeguards.”81 Absent procedural inadequacies, the court held that
“principles of comity preclude[d] characterizing the judicial
system of Trinidad and Tobago as any less fair than our own.”82
Other procedural shortcomings likewise have not prevented
federal courts from finding that the forum was an adequate
alternative. Neither restrictions on discovery nor denial of oral
cross-examinations have led courts to decide that a foreign forum
was inadequate. In Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc.,83 Ecuador was found
to be an adequate available forum despite plaintiffs’ arguments
that Ecuadorian tort law was insufficiently developed and that
class actions were unavailable in Ecuador.84 Plaintiffs also
argued that procedural deficiencies, including protracted administrative proceedings prior to suit, “restrictions on discovery,”
limitations on cross-examination, and limitations on experts,
existed that rendered Ecuador an inadequate forum.85 The court
found each of these rationales for an inadequate forum
unpersuasive.86 Likewise, in In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas
Plant Disaster (Bhopal Litigation), the plaintiffs raised several
79

Id. at 8.
Id. at 9.
81
Id.; see also, e.g., Murty, 92 F.R.D at 482 (“Where the traditions and powers of
a foreign judiciary are uncertain an American court should not dismiss a case ‘without resort to a comparison of alternative procedural safeguards.’ ” (quoting Phoenix
Can. Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 78 F.R.D. 445, 455 (D. Del. 1978), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part, 842 F.2d 1466 (3d Cir. 1988))).
82
Flynn, 141 F.R.D. at 9 (quoting Murty, 92 F.R.D at 482) (finding that
“[p]rinciples of comity as well as common knowledge preclude our characterizing the
French judicial system as any less fair than our own”).
83
142 F. Supp. 2d 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d as modified, 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir.
2002).
84
Id. at 539–42.
85
Id. at 542–43.
86
Id. at 539–43. The Aguinda court also addressed that Ecuador was an unsatisfactory alternative forum based on the claim that the Ecuadorian judiciary was
corrupt. Id. at 543. This argument is addressed below. See infra text accompanying
notes 107–178.
80
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procedural and practical issues with respect to India as an
adequate forum, including the underdevelopment and “lack of
sophistication [of] Indian tort law,” the court system’s inability to
manage complex tort litigation, limitations on the availability of
discovery, and the unavailability of class action devices and “contingent fee arrangements.”87 The court reviewed each of these
arguments and determined that the “courts of India appear to be
well up to the task of handling this case.”88
By contrast, the Fifth Circuit does not focus on procedural
practicalities in its adequate available forum analysis, but rather
focuses on whether the parties will have some form of legal
remedy in the foreign forum and will be treated fairly. For instance, in Baumgart v. Fairchild Aircraft Corp., the court reviewed
whether German courts could provide an adequate available
forum for an action on behalf of German citizens who died in an
airplane crash in Germany.89 The court found that the German
civil code allowed for jurisdiction in the German courts.90 The
court held that “[a] foreign forum is available when the entire
case and all parties can come within the jurisdiction of that
forum.”91 Further, “[a] foreign forum is adequate when the parties
will not be deprived of all remedies or treated unfairly, even
though they may not enjoy the same benefits as they might
receive in an American court.”92
The Fifth Circuit took this analysis to its ultimate and
logical conclusion in Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., when the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Texas consolidated several suits filed in Texas regarding the use of the pesticide that contained the chemical dibromochloropropane—
DBCP.93 The pesticide, manufactured by Dow Chemical and Shell
Oil, had been banned from use in the United States due to claims
of “sterility, testicular atrophy, miscarriages, liver damage, cancer and other ailments,”94 but was still distributed for use in

87
634 F. Supp. 842, 848–53 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff’d as modified, 809 F.2d 195 (2d
Cir. 1987).
88
Id. at 852.
89
981 F.2d 824, 827 (5th Cir. 1993).
90
Id. at 835.
91
Id. (quoting In re Air Crash Disaster, 821 F.2d 1147, 1165 (5th Cir. 1987)).
92
Id. (quoting In re Air Crash Disaster, 821 F.2d at 1165).
93
890 F. Supp. 1324, 1335 (S.D. Tex. 1995), aff’d, 231 F.3d 165 (5th Cir. 2000).
94
Patrickson v. Dole Food Co., 251 F.3d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 2001), aff’d in part,
cert. dismissed in part, 538 U.S. 468 (2003).
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developing nations, including “Burkina Faso, Costa Rica, Dominica,
Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Ivory Coast, Nicaragua, Panama,
the Philippines, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent.”95
After addressing myriad procedural issues, the district court
turned to the forum non conveniens analysis and tackled the
question of adequate available forum. The court started its inquiry by stating that “[a] foreign forum is adequate when the
parties will not be deprived of all remedies or treated unfairly
even though they may not enjoy the same benefits as they might
receive in an American court.”96 The plaintiffs raised numerous
substantive and procedural deficiencies, including the lack of
contingent fee arrangements, vastly lower monetary awards, lack
of civil juries, inability to recover for non-economic losses and
punitive damages, restrictions on witnesses and the ability to
testify, and discovery limitations.97 The court ruled that these
concerns were not relevant to the analysis of adequate available
forum, but rather weighed into the analysis of the litigants’
private interests.98 Based on this standard, the court found that
all twelve forums were adequate based primarily on affidavits of
the parties’ expert witnesses who advised on the ability to
recover for injuries under the various forums’ legal regimes.99
The court, however, failed to address critical issues such as the
judicial system’s independence, reliability, or ability in each
foreign country. Likewise, in DeSirey v. Unique Vacations, the
court engaged in little to no analysis of critical factors that
should encompass the adequate available forum. In determining
whether St. Lucia was an adequate forum for a negligence claim,
the District Court of the Eastern District of Missouri instead
relied on the assurances of the defendant’s expert witness, an
attorney from the foreign forum, that the forum was adequate to
hear the tort claim and on judicial precedent that St. Lucia
provided an adequate forum.100
The Eleventh Circuit, however, recognized the inherent
conflict in courts’ engaging in an adequate available forum
analysis with respect to a foreign forum judicial system’s

95

Delgado, 890 F. Supp. at 1337 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 1356 (quoting In re Air Crash Disaster, 821 F.2d at 1165).
97
Id. at 1357 n.79.
98
Id. at 1365.
99
Id. at 1335, 1358–65, 1369, 1371.
100
DeSirey v. Unique Vacations, Inc., No. 4:13 CV 881 RWS, 2014 WL 272369,
at *2 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 24, 2014).
96
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independence, reliability, and ability. In Esfeld v. Costa Crociere,
S.P.A., the court rightly noted that “foreign relations are implicated in the forum non conveniens calculus,” thus “federal courts
necessarily must analyze the interest that the foreign country
has in the dispute, an analysis that may raise issues of international comity.”101 In this regard, while courts require defendants
to demonstrate that the forum offer some remedy, courts “have
not always required that defendants do much to refute allegations of partiality and inefficiency in the alternative forum.”102 In
fact, the Second Circuit has stated that “considerations of comity
preclude a court from adversely judging the quality of a foreign
justice system absent a showing of inadequate procedural safeguards.”103
Expert witness testimony is often relied upon in assessing
the adequacy of a foreign forum. In Leon v. Millon Air, Inc., Ecuadorian citizens filed suit in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Florida to recover for fatalities suffered
by Ecuadorian residents resulting from an airline crash in
Ecuador.104 Affidavits were filed by both American and Ecuadorian lawyers affirming the adequacy of the Ecuadorian judicial
system.105 Plaintiffs contested this assertion, alleging the Ecuadorian legal system was “in turmoil and had been recently shut
down by a strike of the judges.”106
The court began its adequate alternative forum analysis by
articulating that “[a]vailability and adequacy warrant separate
consideration.”107 A forum is available when jurisdiction may be
asserted over the litigation, that is, when the defendant is “amenable to process” in the foreign jurisdiction.108 A forum is adequate
when the defendant has demonstrated that “the alternative
forum offers at least some relief.”109 However, while “[a]n adequate
forum need not be a perfect forum,” the Eleventh Circuit did note
101

289 F.3d 1300, 1312 (11th Cir. 2002).
Leon v. Millon Air, Inc., 251 F.3d 1305, 1311 (11th Cir. 2001).
103
PT United Can Co. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 138 F.3d 65, 73 (2d Cir. 1998).
104
251 F.3d at 1308.
105
Id. at 1309.
106
Id.
107
Id. at 1311 (citing Satz v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 244 F.3d 1279, 1283
(11th Cir. 2001)).
108
Id. (quoting Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 n.22 (1981)).
109
Id. For example, the First Circuit reversed a forum non conveniens dismissal
when the defendant did not prove that claims for breach of contract and tortious
interference with contract were recognized causes of action under Turkish law.
Mercier v. Sheraton Int’l, Inc., 935 F.2d 419, 425 (1st Cir. 1991).
102

174

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94:157

that “extreme amounts of partiality or inefficiency may render
the alternative forum inadequate.”110 In making this determination, the court held that the defendants had “the ultimate burden
of persuasion” on the issue, but only after the plaintiffs had
sufficiently substantiated the allegations of inefficiency, delay, or
corruption.111 In analyzing the efficiency and impartiality of the
Ecuadorian courts, the court determined—without any concerns
about comity or hesitancy about the impact on foreign relations—
that the plaintiff had failed to sufficiently demonstrate that the
Ecuadorian court could neither reasonably nor expeditiously
adjudicate the wrongful death claims presented in the litigation,
and thus Ecuador presented an adequate forum for the
litigation.112
An outlier in the adequate available forum analysis and one
that definitively demonstrates the confusion caused by the
Supreme Court’s lack of guidance is the Eighth Circuit’s opinion
in Reid-Walen v. Hansen, where the court seemed to conflate the
issue of adequacy with the private factors of convenience of the
parties.113 The district court had dismissed the case under forum
non conveniens in favor of the foreign forum of Jamaica.114 The
Eighth Circuit disagreed and reversed the district court, primarily based on the fact that the district court failed to assess
the plaintiff’s ability to litigate in Jamaica.115 The court was
specifically cognizant of “the realities of the plaintiff’s position,
financial and otherwise, and his or her ability as a practical matter to bring suit in the alternative forum.”116 The Eighth Circuit,
in reversing the district court, took into consideration that
“trying the case in Jamaica was so infeasible, both practically
and financially, that Reid-Walen would not pursue the matter if
unable to litigate in her chosen forum . . . . In this case, the

110

Leon, 251 F.3d at 1311–12. Excessive delays in the litigation may make the
forum so inefficient as to render it an inadequate forum. See, e.g., Bhatnagar v.
Surrendra Overseas Ltd., 52 F.3d 1220, 1228 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding that the Indian
court was an inefficient and hence inadequate forum when delays of up to twentyfive years were possible).
111
Leon, 251 F.3d at 1312.
112
Id. at 1314.
113
933 F.2d 1390, 1401 (8th Cir. 1991).
114
Reid-Walen v. Hansen, 715 F. Supp. 270, 272 (E.D. Mo. 1989), rev’d, 933 F.2d
1390 (8th Cir. 1991).
115
Reid-Walen, 933 F.2d at 1401.
116
Id. at 1398 (quoting Lehman v. Humphrey Cayman, Ltd., 713 F.2d 339, 346
(8th Cir. 1983)).
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‘alternative forum’ is really not much of a forum at all.”117 Thus,
this decision demonstrates how federal courts have struggled
with addressing the procedural and practical problems that
encompass the alternative available forum analysis.
In addition to reviewing procedural and practical difficulties
in an adequate alternative forum analysis, the courts often are
called upon to address the adequacy of a foreign forum based on
allegations of corruption, disorder, and poorly developed jurisprudence. While these issues are often affirmatively raised, the
courts have seldom ruled in plaintiffs’ favor, instead relying on
international comity to find that “[i]t is not the business of our
courts to assume the responsibility for supervising the integrity
of the judicial system of another sovereign nation.”118
In 1997, in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Kavlin, the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida established the
high standard that subsequent courts have emulated in
evaluating whether a court should invalidate the adequacy of a
foreign forum on the basis of corruption.119 In Kavlin, the defendant Casa Kavlin was a Bolivian distributor for Kodak,
distributing goods such as “photographic laboratory equipment,
films, graphic arts materials, x-ray materials, and microfilm.”120
After a period of time, Kodak decided it was not satisfied with its
relationship with Casa Kavlin and sent a representative to
survey the Bolivian market.121 Shortly thereafter, Kodak informed Casa Kavlin that it was terminating its relationship and
the representative sent by Kodak “would be responsible for
Kodak sales, supplies distribution, and representation in
Bolivia.”122 Casa Kavlin then filed a written criminal complaint
against the Kodak representative that included “falsifying documents, espionage against Casa Kavlin, [and] stealing Casa
Kavlin’s clients.”123 These allegations resulted in the issuance of
an arrest warrant, the representative’s appearance before a judge
that was the godfather of the child of Casa Kavlin’s attorney, and
the representative’s eventual incarceration in a rat-infested
prison alongside murderers and drug dealers for eight days,
117

Id. at 1399.
Chesley v. Union Carbide Corp., 927 F.2d 60, 66 (2d Cir. 1991) (quoting
Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 536 F.2d 478, 484–85 (2d Cir. 1976)).
119
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Kavlin, 978 F. Supp. 1078, 1084–85 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
120
Id. at 1080.
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
Id.
118
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which he survived only by “buy[ing] the right to live in a jail cell
for $5,000.”124 Casa Kavlin also arranged for the attorney of
Kodak’s representative and two other Kodak employees to be
charged as criminal co-conspirators.125 All four individuals were
subsequently convicted by the Bolivian court in absentia and
each sentenced to five years in prison.126
Casa Kavlin then brought civil suit against Kodak in Bolivia,
in which it sought $10 million in damages.127 Kodak, in turn,
sued Casa Kavlin in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida, alleging various causes of actions
under Bolivian law “including extortion, false accusation and
denunciation, exercise of monopoly of work, and a declaratory
judgment that Casa Kavlin is not entitled to the relief it seeks in
its Bolivian complaint.”128 Kodak’s representative also sued Casa
Kavlin claiming that its actions in having him jailed in order to
extort Kodak violated “the law of nations.”129 The defendant
moved to dismiss the complaint filed in United States federal
court on grounds that included lack of personal jurisdiction and
forum non conveniens.130
With respect to the forum non conveniens argument, the
“[p]laintiffs essentially argue[d] that the Courts of Bolivia are so
corrupt and slow as to make fair and timely resolution of their
claims highly unlikely.”131 The district court began its analysis of
whether an adequate available forum existed by noting the
argument that “[t]he ‘alternative forum is too corrupt to be
adequate’ . . . [and] does not enjoy a particularly impressive track
record.”132 In fact, the court specifically noted that it was unable
to locate any published opinion that adopted the position that a
forum was inadequate due to corruption in the judicial system.133
124
Id. at 1080–81. Casa Kavlin allegedly attempted to extort Kodak in exchange
for dropping the charges against its representative. Id.
125
Id. at 1081.
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
Id. at 1081–82.
129
Id. at 1082.
130
Id.
131
Id. at 1084.
132
Id.
133
Id. However, the court noted a number of jurisdictions where this particular
argument had been specifically rejected. Id.; see Blanco v. Banco Indus. de Venez.,
S.A., 997 F.2d 974, 981–82 (2d Cir. 1993) (determining that Venezuela was not an
inadequate forum even though plaintiff presented evidence of corruption when the
parties named Venezuela the chosen forum through a forum selection clause);
Mercier v. Sheraton Int’l, Inc., 981 F.2d 1345, 1351 (1st Cir. 1992) (concluding that
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Since Kodak had transacted business in Bolivia for seventy
years, the court reasoned that absent a compelling counterargument, “having made its bed in Bolivia, Kodak should lie there
too.”134 Yet, the court found that the overwhelming evidence
presented by the plaintiffs, including comments by the Bolivian
Minister of Justice,135 noted legal scholars,136 Bolivian government officials,137 and official United States government reports,138
provided ample justification to doubt the adequacy of Bolivia as
an alternative forum. While the defendants “vigorously” disputed
that they manipulated the Bolivian judicial system and that
corruption was not as rampant as alleged by the plaintiff, the
court ultimately concluded that defendants did not meet the
“burden of proving the existence of an adequate available forum,”
and thus the court denied the motion to dismiss on the grounds
of forum non conveniens.139

Turkey was an adequate forum even though plaintiff alleged that Turkish judiciary
had a “ ‘profound bias’ against Americans and foreign women”); Torres v. S. Peru
Copper Corp., 965 F. Supp. 899, 903 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (holding that Peru was not an
inadequate available forum as insufficient evidence was provided to demonstrate
that Peruvian courts were corrupt), aff’d, 113 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 1997); Banco
Mercantil, S.A. v. Hernandez Arencibia, 927 F. Supp. 565, 567–68 (D.P.R. 1996)
(rejecting the argument that Dominican Republic courts were “so . . . corrupt as
to . . . provide an [in]adequate available forum”).
134
Kavlin, 978 F. Supp. at 1085.
135
According to the court, “[a] Bolivian newspaper article published September
20, 1996, quotes the Minister of Justice as saying that ‘the current judicial system is
a collection agency and the penal system is an agent of extorsion [sic].’ ” Id. at 1085.
136
Professor Keith S. Rosenn of the University of Miami Law School, based on
World Bank and State Department reports, cited widespread corruption in the
Bolivian courts. Id. Professor Eduardo A. Gamarra of Florida International University stated “bribery of judges, attorneys, and even Supreme Court justices [was] a
routine practice. . . . Bribery range[d] from relatively small to extremely high
amounts. . . . In 1991, eight members of the Supreme Court were charged with acts
of corruption.” Id. (second alteration in original).
137
Luis Peñarana, a Bolivian lawyer who was the legal counsel to the Bolivian
House of Representatives judicial oversight commission, stated “ ‘[c]orruption [was]
endemic to the judicial system of Bolivia,’ existing ‘at all levels of the system.’ ” Id.
(first alteration in original).
138
The State Department Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1995
submitted to the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the
House Committee on International Relations stated “[t]he justice system . . . is
overburdened, afflicted by the corruption of some judges, and lacking public
credibility. . . . Judges are underpaid, poorly disciplined, and susceptible to political
influence. . . . [M]ajor political parties influence the judicial selection process and
decisions in particular cases.” Id. at 1086 (second and third alterations in original).
139
Id. at 1086–87.

178

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94:157

As noted by the Kavlin court itself, this case is an anomaly in
the universe of adequate available forum cases.140 In 2006, the
Ninth Circuit was called upon to address the allegations of
corruption in the Philippine courts as the basis to deny a forum
non conveniens motion. In Tuazon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
the plaintiff, Tuazon, smoked Salem cigarettes for more than
forty years, was eventually diagnosed with chronic obstructive
pulmonary disorder in his native country of the Philippines, and
subsequently moved to the state of Washington.141 Tuazon sued
R.J. Reynolds in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Washington, alleging that Reynolds engaged in an
effort to “suppress information regarding the addictive and
health-related effects of cigarettes.”142 After finding that the district court had properly asserted personal jurisdiction over the
case, the Ninth Circuit had to address Reynolds’ motion to
dismiss based on forum non conveniens, starting with plaintiff’s
claims that the Philippines failed to provide an adequate
available forum since the “Philippine courts [were] too corrupt
and plagued with delays.”143 Unlike the significant evidentiary
support presented in Kavlin, Tuazon relied “on his own experience as a lawyer and businessman in the Philippines” and upon
State Department reports that detailed “corruption, judicial
bias[,] and inefficiency” in the Philippine court system, but which
were primarily “focused on human rights in the Philippines, and
the criminal justice system.”144 While the Ninth Circuit recognized that a forum may be inadequate if the “legal system [was]
so fraught with corruption, delay[,] and bias as to provide ‘no
remedy at all,’ ” the evidence offered by the plaintiff did not
overcome R.J. Reynolds’ arguments that the Philippines was an
adequate available forum.145
Likewise, Peru was determined to be an adequate available
forum in Carijano v. Occidental Petroleum Corp. despite allegations of widespread discrimination and corruption in the
140

Id. at 1087.
433 F.3d 1163, 1167 (9th Cir. 2006).
142
Id. at 1168.
143
Id. at 1177–78.
144
Id. at 1178–79.
145
Id. at 1179. While the Ninth Circuit therefore determined that the district
court’s finding of inadequacy of the Philippines forum was not supported, it ultimately upheld the district court’s denial of R.J. Reynolds’ forum non conveniens
motion based on a balancing of the private and public factors that weighed in favor
of retaining the litigation in the United States. Id. at 1179–80, 1181.
141
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Peruvian judicial system.146 According to the complaint filed in
Carijano, Occidental knowingly “discharge[d] millions of gallons
of toxic oil byproducts” into the rivers of the northern Peruvian
rainforest.147 The Achuar, an indigenous people who lived in the
Peruvian rainforest, used these polluted rivers for “drinking,
washing, and fishing,” which allegedly resulted in, among other
things, “gastrointestinal problems, kidney trouble, [and] skin
rashes.”148 The Achuar asserted claims “for common law negligence, strict liability, battery, medical monitoring, wrongful
death, fraud and misrepresentation, public and private nuisance,
trespass, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, as well
as a violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law.”149
Occidental moved to dismiss the case on the grounds of forum
non conveniens, which the district court granted based on Peru
being an adequate alternative forum and the balancing of private
and public factors favoring trial in Peru.150
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reviewed whether Peru was an
adequate available forum. After determining that Occidental was
amenable to service of process in Peru, which established its
adequacy as a forum, the court reviewed whether Peruvian
courts offered the Achuar a “satisfactory remedy.”151 While the
parties offered conflicting expert testimony, the plaintiffs argued
that general corruption existed in the Peruvian judicial system
that prevented the Achuar from receiving a satisfactory
remedy.152 Specifically, plaintiffs’ experts testified to “unique
barriers confronting the Achuar Plaintiffs in Peru due to their
ethnicity, poverty, and isolation” and that the court system
contributed to ongoing discrimination against the Achuar.153
Plaintiffs’ expert asserted that the Peruvian judiciary suffered
from “ ‘institutionalized’ corruption, including widespread lobbying of judges, third party informal ‘intermediaries’ between
magistrates and parties, and the exchange of improper favors
and information.”154 In contrast, the expert for Occidental testified that the Peruvian judiciary had become more reliable in
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154

643 F.3d 1216, 1222–23, 1226 (9th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1222.
Id. at 1222–23.
Id. at 1223.
Id.
Id. at 1225.
Id.
Id. at 1226.
Id.
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recent years.155 In particular, he noted that the Peruvian government was fighting corruption including “the removal and
sanctioning of numerous judges as well as improvements in
judicial selection procedures and court infrastructure.” 156
The Ninth Circuit, relying on Tuazon, stated that a party
that wants to demonstrate that a foreign forum is inadequate
“due to corruption” bears the burden to “make a ‘powerful
showing’ that includes specific evidence.”157 After acknowledging
the conflicting views of the expert witnesses, the Ninth Circuit
noted that the district court correctly recognized that “one of the
central ends of the forum non conveniens doctrine is to avert
‘unnecessary indictments by our judges condemning the sufficiency of the courts and legal methods of other nations.’ ”158 As
such, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court’s finding
that the evidence did not support a finding that the Peruvian
judicial system was “so fraught with corruption, delay and bias
as to provide ‘no remedy at all.’ ”159
However, a decidedly different result occurred in the 2015
case In re Montage Technology Group Ltd. Securities Litigation.160 In this case, the defendant Montage was a Cayman
Islands corporation that was “headquartered and primarily
conducting business in China.”161 The plaintiffs were a class of
individuals who had purchased Montage securities and who
subsequently alleged “violations of [s]ections 10(b) and 20(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.”162 The defendants filed a
motion to dismiss the case under Rule 12(b)(6) “and on the
grounds of forum non conveniens.”163
155

Id.
Id.
157
Id. (quoting Tuazon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 433 F.3d 1163, 1179 (9th
Cir. 2006)).
158
Id. (quoting Monegasque de Reassurances S.A.M. v. Nak Naftogaz of Ukr.,
158 F. Supp. 2d 377, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)). See also Monegasque De Reassurances
S.A.M. v. Nak Naftogaz of Ukr., 311 F.3d 488, 499 (2d. Cir. 2002) (refusing to “pass
value judgments on the adequacy of justice and the integrity of [Ukraine’s] judicial
system on the basis of no more than . . . bare denunciations and sweeping generalizations” (first alteration in original)); El-Fadl v. Central Bank of Jordan, 75
F.3d 668, 678 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that the plaintiff’s generalized allegations
regarding the lack of impartiality in the Jordanian judicial system was not sufficient
to find that the Jordanian courts were inadequate).
159
Carijano, 643 F.3d at 1226–27 (quoting Tuazon, 433 F.3d at 1179).
160
78 F. Supp. 3d 1215, 1219 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
161
Id.
162
Id.
163
Id. at 1220.
156
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In addressing the forum non conveniens motion, the district
court began its analysis by stating that the defendants must
demonstrate “that an alternative forum exists, and that it is
adequate.”164 The district court first determined that China was
an available forum as the “[d]efendants [were] amendable to
service of process in [China].”165 The question then turned to
“whether the forum provide[d] an adequate remedy for [the]
plaintiffs’ alleged injuries.”166
Both the plaintiffs’ and defendants’ experts provided testimony regarding Chinese securities law and whether its application
would allow a remedy for plaintiffs’ securities issues. The plaintiffs specifically argued that Chinese law would not apply to the
securities claims as the law governed only domestic Chinese
securities issuances and transactions, not disputes arising from
securities transactions that occurred in the United States.167
Further, the plaintiffs argued that the Chinese securities law
was only applicable once a criminal judgment was entered
against the defendant and no such finding could occur as the
court had “jurisdiction only over domestic securities markets.”168
The defendants countered these arguments by asserting that,
while the Chinese law did not specifically authorize suits against
non-Chinese companies, it did not preclude them, and that the
inability of the courts to issue a criminal judgment did not
preclude the court from issuing a remedy in a private securities
fraud case.169 While the court refused to resolve the issues of
Chinese law raised by the experts, it found that the defendants’
rebuttal of plaintiffs’ experts relied on “speculation as to what
[Chinese] courts could do. They could interpret the [applicable]
Regulations to include jurisdiction over foreign securities
transaction . . . and could waive the typical prerequisites to bring
securities fraud suits.”170 Based on this indefinite speculation,
the court was not convinced that the plaintiffs would have a

164

Id. at 1221 (quoting Tuazon, 433 F.3d at 1178).
Id. “[A]n alternative forum ordinarily exists when the defendant is amenable
to service of process in the foreign forum.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Lueck
v. Sundstrand Corp., 236 F.3d 1137, 1143 (9th Cir. 2001)).
166
Id. “The foreign forum must provide the plaintiff with some remedy for his
wrong in order for the alternative forum to be adequate.” Id. (quoting Lueck, 236
F.3d at 1143).
167
Id. at 1222.
168
Id.
169
Id.
170
Id. at 1222–23.
165
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remedy in the foreign forum and denied the motion to dismiss on
grounds of forum non conveniens.171
Yet, shortly thereafter, in the 2016 case of Jiangsu Hongyuan
Pharmaceutical Co. v. DI Global Logistics, Inc., the Chinese
courts were found to be an adequate available forum for a lawsuit
based on “contractual and noncontractual claims” due to the
defendant’s failure to pay for “shipments of chemical products.”172
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida reviewed the availability of China and concluded that the
defendant “agreed to submit to China’s jurisdiction.”173 In the
court’s estimation, “[w]hether China is an available alternative
forum is a simple inquiry in this instance, as ‘[a]n agreement by
the defendant to submit to the jurisdiction of the foreign forum
typically satisfies the availability requirement.’ ”174
In addition to determining the availability of the foreign
forum, the district court also had to decide whether the foreign
forum was adequate. The court began its analysis by looking to
Leon v. Millon Air, Inc., and stated that the defendant only has
the burden of persuasion with respect to establishing adequacy
when the plaintiff first “substantiates its allegations of corruption
or delay.”175 The plaintiff, Hongyuan, provided scholarly articles
as evidence of the inadequacy of the Chinese judicial system
indicating “potential for excessive trial delays, obstructive legal
counsel, corruption, lack of legal safeguards, [and] undue influence by political leadership.”176 The court, in reviewing decisions
by other district courts, found that “[t]he great weight of authority holds that ‘generalized, anecdotal complaints of corruption are
not enough for a federal court to declare that [a nation’s] legal
system is so corrupt that it can’t serve as an adequate forum.’ ”177
Thus, the district court held that plaintiff’s generalized, anecdotal, and unsubstantiated evidence was too speculative to warrant
a finding that China would not provide an adequate forum.178
171

Id. at 1223.
159 F. Supp. 3d 1316, 1320–21 (S.D. Fla. 2016).
173
Id. at 1332.
174
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Tang v. Synutra Int’l, Inc., No. DKC
09-0088, 2010 WL 1375373, at *5 (D. Md. Mar. 29, 2010), aff’d, 656 F.3d 242 (4th
Cir. 2011)).
175
Id. at 1330 (citing Leon v. Millon Air, Inc., 251 F.3d 1305, 1312 (11th Cir.
2001)).
176
Id. (alteration in original).
177
Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Stroitelstvo Bulg. Ltd. v. Bulg.Am. Enter. Fund, 589 F.3d 417, 421 (7th Cir. 2009)).
178
Id. at 1331–32.
172
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III. ADEQUATE AVAILABLE FORUM—HOW COURTS
ARE INFLUENCED IN THEIR DECISION-MAKING
As is apparent from the previous Part, many determinants
affect how a court will address the issue of whether an alternative forum is adequate. To better understand and categorize the
factors that impact the court’s decision-making on this issue,
Michael Lii performed an empirical examination of adequate
available forum decisions.179 After setting the time and search
parameters to identify cases that analyzed adequate alternative
forums, Lii identified 1,083 cases that involved a decision about
forum non conveniens with an alternative forum in a foreign
country, which was eventually whittled down to 692 cases.180
Lii determined that between 1982 and 2006, 105 different
countries were discussed as adequate alternative forums in
forum non conveniens analyses.181 However, only eighteen percent of the decisions were denials of the forum non conveniens
motion “based on inadequate forum.”182 In other words, “a foreign forum was judged to be adequate 82% of the time
[throughout] the period of 1982 through 2006.”183 Further, whether a case involved a tort claim or a contract dispute was
statistically insignificant in determining whether a foreign forum
was adequate, as courts found the forum adequate over eightythree percent of the time in such cases.184
Cases were also analyzed using variables that were
determined to possibly “influence a judge’s perception” of the
adequacy or inadequacy of a foreign court, such as “measures of
political rights, civil liberties, political stability, government effectiveness, rule of law, and corruption.”185 Lii posited that
countries with more “political rights and civil liberties” may have
a higher degree of adequacy determinations by the courts than
those countries that are considered “more repressive.”186
179

Michael T. Lii, An Empirical Examination of the Adequate Alternative Forum
in the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 8 RICHMOND J. GLOB. L. & BUS. 513, 513
(2009).
180
Id. at 521–22.
181
Id. at 525.
182
Id. at 526 tbl.4.
183
Id.
184
Id. at 531 tbl.10 (showing that 250 contract cases were reviewed in which an
adequate forum was found 83.6% of the time and 354 tort cases which included “personal injury, defamation, and tort” and in which an adequate forum was found 83.9%
of the time).
185
Id. at 522.
186
Id. at 537.
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Utilizing a study by Freedom House, an organization that measures political rights and civil liberties and classifies countries as
“free, partly free, and not free,” Lii determined that courts found
a foreign forum in a free country as adequate eighty-six percent
of the time, while a foreign forum in a partly free country was
found adequate seventy-eight percent of the time, and not free
countries were found adequate only sixty-four percent of the
time.187 Lii extrapolated from this data that “district courts are
less apt to find an adequate forum in countries with fewer
political rights and fewer civil liberties.”188
A similar result occurs in examining a foreign country’s
degree of political instability and government effectiveness, rule
of law, and control of corruption.189 With respect to political
instability, Lii classified countries in three tiers: the bottom third
of the countries were classified unstable, the middle third were
considered medium stable, and the top third of the countries
were classified as stable.190 Of those countries classified unstable, district courts still found the forums an adequate alternative
seventy-three percent of the time, despite the risk of government
coups or civil war.191 Countries that were considered either medium stable or stable were found to have judicial systems that
provided adequate forums eighty-four percent of the time.192
As with political stability, Lii ranked government effectiveness, rule of law, and control of corruption. According to Lii,
“[e]ffective governments go hand-in-hand with confidence that
the rule of law governs society and a lack of corruption within

187

Id.
Id. at 537–38.
189
Political instability is defined as “a real risk that the government could be
overthrown or a real risk of civil war [which] could leave the courts malfunctioning
or unable to adjudicate disputes.” Id. at 539.
Government effectiveness measures the quality of the civil servants in a
country and the independence of the civil service from political pressures.
Rule of law seeks to measure the confidence . . . individuals have that the
rules of law in a country will be obeyed and enforced as well as the
effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary. Control of corruption is a
measure of how well a society controls the use of public power for private
gain.
Id. at 541 (footnotes omitted) (citing FAQ, WORLD BANK: WORLD GOVERNANCE
INDICATORS, https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/Home/FAQ [https://perma.cc/
4WP3-UXU3] (last visited Nov. 4, 2020)).
190
Id. at 540 tbl.18.
191
Id. at 539–40, 540 tbl.18.
192
Id. at 540 tbl.18.
188

2020]

A SEPARATION OF POWERS ANALYSIS

185

government institutions.”193 This grouping was then broken into
three tiers, with each tier containing approximately one-third of
the countries observed. The bottom one-third contained those countries that were “the average of the least effective governments,
the least respect for the rule of law countries, and the most
corrupt countries.”194 With regard to this bottom tier, district
courts found that despite the lack of effective government,
respect for the rule of law, and corruption, the forum was still
adequate sixty-seven percent of the time.195 In contrast, those
countries in the top tier—with the most effective government,
respect for the rule of law, and least corrupt—had adequate
forums eighty-six percent of the time.196 Based on these results,
Lii rightly concludes that when district courts are reviewing
whether an alternative foreign forum is adequate, the court is
influenced by factors outside the parameters of the Piper
decision, including “the political, social, and economic conditions”
of the foreign forum, potentially without being fully apprised or
informed of the critical information needed to make such a
determination that could affect foreign relations.197
IV. SEPARATION OF POWERS—WHO HAS THE
AUTHORITY OVER FOREIGN RELATIONS?
A central tenet of our tripartite constitutional government is
the division of powers among the three branches of federal
government and the resulting checks and balances that result
from this separation. However, no unifying doctrine with respect
to separation of powers has evolved over the two hundred years
that the term has been used in the American constitutional
framework.198 The concept of separation of powers and the concurrent, complementary balance of powers is based upon the
Framers’ experiences surrounding the duties and problems of
managing a government. “The [F]ramers of the American Constitution did not want a political system so fragmented in structure,
so divided in authority, that government could not function.”199
193
194
195
196
197
198

Id. at 541.
Id.
Id. at 542.
Id.
Id. at 552.
GERHARD CASPER, SEPARATING POWER: ESSAYS ON THE FOUNDING PERIOD 8

(1997).
199
LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE
PRESIDENT 7–8 (6th ed. 2014).
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On May 30, 1787, the Framers adopted a resolution “that a national government ought to be established consisting of a supreme
Legislative, Judiciary, and Executive,”200 which was basically the
entire discussion regarding separation of powers by the Framers.
Almost one hundred and fifty years later, Justice Story stated
that the Framers adopted separation of powers but “endeavored
to prove that a rigid adherence to it in all cases would be
subversive of the efficiency of the government, and result in the
destruction of the public liberties.”201 This position carried forward to present day with the Supreme Court opining in Morrison
v. Olson that the Court has “never held that the Constitution
requires that the three branches of Government ‘operate with
absolute independence.’ ”202 To best understand, then, the role of
the Executive with respect to foreign relations, one must look to
original understanding and meaning of executive power, historical practice by the Executive, and the explicit constitutional
structure regarding the Executive’s role in foreign affairs.
With respect to the area of foreign affairs, the Constitution
provides “checks and balances” by distributing powers among the
three branches of federal government, “with specified procedures
setting forth how these powers can be exercised and how the
various entities interact.”203 The Framers, while advocating policies and positions that supported separation of powers among the
three branches of government, based on their experiences with
the inefficiencies of the Continental Congress, also desired a
separate and independent Executive.204 While no “foreign affairs”
clause exists in the Constitution that explicitly and exclusively
grants foreign affairs powers to the President, the conduct of
foreign affairs and its accompanying powers often has rested
with the Executive.
In achieving the separation of powers such that the three
branches act as checks and balances on each other, it is
important to recognize that many of the powers exercised by the
branches are implied rather than explicit. As early as 1793,
Alexander Hamilton, using “Pacificus” as a pseudonym, stated that
200
1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 29–31 (Max
Farrand ed., 1966).
201
1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 396 (Melville M. Bigelow ed., Little, Brown, & Co. 5th ed. 1891) (1833).
202
487 U.S. 654, 693–94 (1988) (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,
707 (1974)).
203
RAMSEY, supra note 17, at 4.
204
FISHER, supra note 199, at 9.
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President Washington’s authority to issue the Neutrality Proclamation205 was derived from Article II of the Constitution that
“[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President of the
United States of America.”206 It was Hamilton’s view that outside
of the Senate’s power to advise and consent in the appointment of
officers, its role in making treaties, and Congress’s explicit
authority to declare war, “all other executive powers were lodged
solely in the President.”207 That being said, courts are not forbidden to address cases that touch upon foreign affairs, and will
routinely decide cases that have foreign relations implications.
Courts should not engage, however, in foreign affairs policymaking that is normally reserved as the purview of the Executive.
The notion that the Executive has inherent foreign affairs
powers that are not explicitly reserved to the Executive or to
Congress and that are therefore derived extra-constitutionally
has been embraced by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,208 Dames & Moore v. Regan,209 and
reaffirmed recently in Zivotofsky v. Kerry.210 In Curtiss-Wright,
Justice Sutherland wrote for the Court that the President was
“the sole organ of the federal government in the field of
international relations.”211 In 1934, President Roosevelt imposed
an embargo prohibiting arms sales to both Bolivia and Paraguay.212 Curtiss-Wright violated the embargo and was prosecuted by the federal government.213 The company claimed that
the embargo was unconstitutional on the grounds that Congress

205
Id. at 15–16. The Neutrality Proclamation was a declaration by President
Washington regarding America’s neutrality in the war between England and France.
George Washington, Neutrality Proclamation, FOUNDERS ONLINE (Apr. 22, 1793),
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-12-02-0371 [https://perma.cc/
T4KW-KL9Y]. Relying on the “law of nations” President Washington instructed all
Americans to avoid involvement in the war or face prosecution. Id.
206
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
207
FISHER, supra note 199, at 15–16 (citing 4 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER
HAMILTON 439 (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1904)).
208
299 U.S. 304, 329 (1936).
209
453 U.S. 654, 685–86 (1981).
210
576 U.S. 1, 13–14 (2015).
211
299 U.S. at 320. Many commentators have questioned the reasoning of
Curtiss-Wright, and subsequent Supreme Court decisions prior to Zivotofsky v. Kerry
had not given it much weight. See, e.g., RAMSEY, supra note 17, at 14. However,
lower court judges, scholars, and lawyers have continued to invoke the reasoning of
Curtiss-Wright to argue that the President “has a special role in foreign affairs” that
reaches beyond the text of the Constitution. Id.
212
Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 311–13.
213
Id. at 311.
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had delegated too much authority to the Executive.214 The Court
ruled against Curtiss-Wright based on the President’s broad
powers in the area of foreign affairs despite the Constitution’s
silence on this particular subject.215 The Court reasoned that
simply because the Constitution did not explicitly grant a
particular foreign affairs power to the Executive did not mean
that it did not exist.216
Further, even though areas of overlap between Congress and
the President regarding the exercise of foreign affairs exist in the
Constitution, when Congress fails to act, the President may exercise authority. During the Korean War, as a result of a threatened strike at major United States steel manufacturing mills
that endangered the production of supplies needed for the war,
President Harry Truman ordered that the government take
control of the mills.217 Congress did not authorize this action;
rather, the President asserted that he was acting under his own
implied Constitutional authority.218 Justice Black, writing for the
Court in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (The Steel Seizure Case), disagreed with President Truman’s stance and stated
that presidential power had to come either through an act of
Congress or directly from specific provisions of the Constitution.219
Justice Jackson, while agreeing with the outcome of the
Court, wrote in his concurrence in the Steel Seizure Case what
has now become the familiar tripartite framework regarding the
exercise of presidential power.220 First, “[w]hen the President
acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress,
his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he
possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate.”221
Second, “in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of
authority” there exists a “zone of twilight in which he and
Congress may have concurrent authority,” and where “congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may” allow the Executive
to exercise his power.222 Finally, if “the President takes measures
214

Id. at 314–15.
Id. at 318–20, 322.
216
Id. at 321–22.
217
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (The Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S.
579, 583 (1952).
218
Id. at 583–84.
219
Id. at 691.
220
Id. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring).
221
Id. at 635.
222
Id. at 637.
215
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incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress . . .
he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any
costitutional powers of Congress over the matter.”223
Justice Jackson indicated that because Congress had disapproved of the presidential action of the seizure of the steel mills,
the President’s authority was at its “lowest ebb.”224 This condition
effectively prevented the President’s actions unless his decision
was grounded in Constitutional textual authority.225 Further, if
Congress had not disapproved, then the President would take
action in a “zone of twilight” where constitutional authority is not
explicit, but rather, where implied authority to act is often
found.226 Jackson’s formulation of presidential authority with
regard to foreign affairs “assumed that the Constitution was
incomplete on key foreign affairs matters, and that the gaps
would be filled in other ways.”227 Thus, Jackson’s belief, as
articulated in the Steel Seizure Case, was that the President’s
authority to act in foreign affairs was created as a result of “the
branches of government . . . implicitly[ ] working together.228
Events in 1979 resulted in the Supreme Court again looking
at the Executive’s power with regard to foreign affairs. The
precursor to the Supreme Court decision in Dames & Moore v.
Regan was the conflict that resulted between the Islamic
Republic of Iran and the United States of America that began
with the taking of hostages at the United States Embassy. On
the morning of November 4, a group of Iranian students stormed
and seized the American Embassy and, with the coordination and
ultimate complicity of the Iranian government, restrained over
50 United States embassy personnel against their will for 444
days.229 The Iranian Hostage crisis resulted in President Carter
taking a series of punitive actions against the Islamic Republic of
Iran, including freezing Iranian assets in the United States.230
223

Id.
Id. at 637–38, 640.
225
Id. at 637–38.
226
Id. at 637.
227
RAMSEY, supra note 17, at 53.
228
Id.
229
MARK BOWDEN, GUESTS OF THE AYATOLLAH: THE FIRST BATTLE IN AMERICA’S
WAR WITH MILITANT ISLAM 2, 5, 639 (2006).
230
President Carter acted pursuant to the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act, and blocked the removal or transfer of “all property and interests in
property of the Government of Iran, its instrumentalities and controlled entities[,]
and the Central Bank of Iran which are or become subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States.” Exec. Order No. 12,170, 3 C.F.R. 457 (1979).
224
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At the same time, United States citizens brought thousands of
claims against Iranian entities in United States courts for losses
suffered when the Islamic Republic took over the country and
ousted the then-leader, the Shah of Iran.231
The United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran
eventually began negotiations to resolve the issues that arose
due to the Islamic Republic of Iran’s gross violations of international law.232 Two of the most important issues to be resolved
during the negotiations for the release of the hostages were how
to deal with the Iranian assets that were frozen in the United
States and how to address the many thousands of claims that
United States citizens had against Iran in an appropriate
forum.233
After several months of discussions, on January 18, 1981,
the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran reached an
agreement memorialized in two Declarations of the Government
of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, known as the
Algiers Accords.234 The two Declarations—the General Declaration and the Claims Settlement Declaration—addressed the

231
On November 15, 1979, the Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign
Assets Control issued a regulation that provided that “[u]nless licensed or
authorized . . . any attachment, judgment, decree, lien, execution, garnishment, or
other judicial process is null and void with respect to any property in which on or
since [November 14, 1979,] there existed an interest of Iran.” 31 C.F.R. § 535.203(e)
(1980). On November 26, 1979, President Carter authorized “[c]ertain judicial
proceedings” against Iran but did not allow the “entry of any judgment or of any
decree or order of similar or analogous effect . . . .” 31 C.F.R. § 535.504(b)(1) (1979).
232
Roberts B. Owen, The Final Negotiation and Release in Algiers, in AMERICAN
HOSTAGES IN IRAN: THE CONDUCT OF A CRISIS 297, 298 (Paul H. Kreisberg ed., 1985).
233
Id. at 301.
234
CHARLES N. BROWER & JASON D. BRUESCHKE, THE IRAN-UNITED STATES
CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 6–7, 7 n.16 (1998); GEORGE H. ALDRICH, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF
THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL: AN ANALYSIS OF THE DECISIONS OF
THE TRIBUNAL 5 & n.3 (1996). Even though the two governments only “adhered to”
the provisions of the Algiers Accords and neither the United States Senate nor the
Iranian Majlis ratified the Accords, the document constitutes a “treaty” under
international law. See United States v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 8 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib.
Rep. 189, 207 (1985) (Brower, Arb., concurring) (“This Tribunal has frequently
resorted to the [Vienna] Convention in interpreting the Algiers Accords and the
State Parties have declared the Convention to provide the applicable law of
interpretation.”); see also Nasser Esphahanian v. Bank Tejarat, 2 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib.
Rep. 157, 160 (1983) (“Since the Claims Settlement Declaration and the General
Declaration together constitute a Treaty under international law, we are guided in
interpreting them by Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties of May 23, 1969.”).
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obligations of the two governments vis-à-vis one another.235 The
General Declaration provided that Iran would release the
hostages and that the United States would perform a series of
actions and financial transactions, including releasing and
returning the assets frozen by President Carter236 and nullifying
judicial attachments against Iran obtained by litigants in United
States courts.237
The Claims Settlement Declaration of the Algiers Accords
provided for the creation of the Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal.238 This declaration provided that a Tribunal would be
“established for the purpose of deciding claims of nationals of the
United States against Iran and claims of nationals of Iran
against the United States . . . [which arose] out of debts, contracts, . . . expropriations or other measures affecting property
rights.”239 Additionally, the Tribunal had jurisdiction over claims
of the two governments against each other “arising out of
contractual arrangements between them for the purchase of
goods and services,” and over “dispute[s] as to the interpretation
or performance of any provision” of the Algiers Accords.240
However, claims by the hostages that resulted from their illegal
captivity were specifically excluded from the Claims Settlement
Declaration.241 This exclusionary decision was subsequently ratified through Executive Order242 and has been upheld consistently

235
General Declaration, Declaration of the Democratic and Popular Republic of
Algeria, Jan. 19, 1981 [hereinafter General Declaration], http://www.iusct.net/
General%20Documents/1-General%20Declaration%E2%80%8E.pdf [https://perma.cc/
X5Q8-T2C6]; Claims Settlement Declaration, Declaration of the Government of the
Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by
the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic
Republic of Iran, Jan. 19, 1981 [hereinafter Claims Settlement Declaration],
http://www.iusct.net/General%20Documents/2-Claims%20Settlement%20Declaration.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7CRB-UKWM].
236
The sanctions were revoked by Executive Orders issued contemporaneously
with the Algiers Accords. See Exec. Order Nos. 12,276–12,285, 3 C.F.R. 104–15 (1981);
Exec. Order No. 12,294, 3 C.F.R. 139 (1981).
237
General Declaration, supra note 235.
238
Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 235, art. II, ¶ 1.
239
Id.
240
Id. art. II, ¶¶ 2–3.
241
Id. art. II, ¶ 1; General Declaration, supra note 235, ¶ 11.
242
Prohibition Against Prosecution of Certain Claims, 31 C.F.R. § 535.216(a)
(1981). The exclusion was necessary in order to successfully implement the Algiers
Accords. Exec. Order No. 12,294, 3 C.F.R. 139 (1981). The focus of the Claims
Settlement provisions were solely on property issues, specifically expropriation
claims and contract losses. Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 235, art. II.
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by the judiciary, despite numerous cases filed by the former
hostages.243
Upon the approval of the Algiers Accords, President Ronald
Reagan suspended all lawsuits in United States courts against
Iran that were within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.244 When the
United States construction company Dames & Moore, among others, decided to challenge the constitutionality of this Executive
Order, the Supreme Court of the United States, in expedited
proceedings, upheld the President’s authority to suspend lawsuits in the United States in favor of the alternative forum of the
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal.245
Dames & Moore had claims against the Government of Iran,
the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, and several Iranian
banks, which it had filed in United States court.246 Dames &
Moore claimed that the Atomic Energy Organization terminated
the contract “for its own convenience,” and as a result, owed
Dames & Moore over $3 million “plus interest for services
performed under the contract prior to its termination.”247 With
the signing of the Algiers Accords, Dames & Moore’s suit was
243

See, e.g., Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 729 F.2d 835, 843 (D.C. Cir.
1984); Ledgerwood v. State of Iran, 617 F. Supp. 311, 316 (D.D.C. 1985). The United
States Government agreed to bar claims by the hostages because it concluded that,
since the 1976 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act would likely preclude United
States courts from hearing claims of that nature, such claims would lack merit. See
The Iran Agreements: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Rels., 97th Cong. 98
(1981) (statement of Thomas W. Luce III, Outside General Counsel, Electronic Data
Systems Corp.). However, to ensure that the hostages were not left empty-handed,
Congress passed two statutes–the Hostage Relief Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-449, 94
Stat. 1967 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 5561) and the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and
Antiterrorism Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-399, § 803, 100 Stat. 853 (codified at
5 U.S.C. §§ 5569–70). The hostages, despite the commitment of the United States in
the Accords and the explicit waiver by the United States of their lawsuits, have filed
claims against Iran for monetary damages. To date, all of these lawsuits have been
unsuccessful. Most recently, the plaintiffs sought compensatory and punitive
damages in the amount of $33 billion. Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 333 F.3d
228, 230, 239 (D.C. Cir. 2003). However, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia held that, since Congress did not expressly indicate a clear
intent to abrogate the Algiers Accords with amendments to the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, the court had to uphold the commitments that the United States
made to the Islamic Republic of Iran in order to secure the freedom of the hostages
in 1981. Id. at 237–38. See also Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 646 F.3d 56, 62
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (finding that, absent specific congressional intent, the 2008
amendments to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act did not abrogate the Algiers
Accords).
244
See Exec. Order No. 12,294, § 1, 3 C.F.R. 139.
245
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 655–58, 690 (1981).
246
Id. at 663–64.
247
Id.
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terminated in favor of filing for redress before the Iran-United
States Claims Tribunal.248
Subsequent to President Reagan’s Executive Order suspending all claims against Iran, Dames & Moore filed an action for
“declaratory and injunctive relief” in order “to prevent enforcement of the Executive Orders and Treasury regulations.”249
Dames & Moore argued that the Executive exceeded its statutory
and constitutional powers in implementing the Algiers Accords.250
The Court started its analysis by recognizing that the
question stemmed from the “consequences of different types of
interaction between the two democratic branches in assessing
presidential authority to act in any given case.”251 While the
Supreme Court recognized that the President’s actions with
regard to releasing and returning frozen Iranian assets had
statutory support,252 the Court did not find any explicit statutory
or constitutional authority for suspending or terminating
litigation in United States courts in favor of binding arbitration
before the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal.253 Yet, the Court
upheld the President’s action by reviewing a combination of
factors.
First, the court determined that statutes upon which the
President relied did not provide specific authorization, but rather,
the statutes were “highly relevant in the looser sense of indicating congressional acceptance of a broad scope for executive
action in circumstances such as those presented in this case.”254
Second, the Court looked specifically to the enactment of the
International Claims Settlement Act of 1949.255 Along with a full
discussion of this Act and its subsequent amendments, the Court
cited ten other settlements since 1952 with foreign countries to
248
On February 24, 1981, President Reagan “suspended” all “claims which may
be presented to the . . . Tribunal.” Exec. Order No. 12,294, § 1, 3 C.F.R. 139. These
claims “shall have no legal effect in any action now pending in any court of the
United States.” Id.
249
See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 666–67.
250
Id. at 667.
251
Id. at 668.
252
Id. at 674 (Because the President’s action in nullifying the attachments and
ordering the transfer of assets was taken pursuant to specific congressional authorization, it is “supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of
judicial interpretation, and the burden of persuasion would rest heavily upon any
who might attack it.” (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579, 637 (1952))).
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which Congress had not objected that supported its “conclusion
that Congress ha[d] implicitly approved the practice of claim
settlement by executive agreement.”256 Finally, Congress had not
disapproved of the President’s suspension of claims. Although
Congress held hearings on the Algiers Accords, “Congress ha[d]
not enacted legislation, or even passed a resolution, indicating its
displeasure with the Agreement.”257 As a result, the Court determined that Congress had not “resisted the exercise of Presidential
authority.”258
Executive power over foreign affairs was once again
judicially tested in Zivotofsky v. Kerry. In 2002, Menachem
Binyamin Zivotofsky was born in Jerusalem to United States
citizens; shortly thereafter, his mother went to the United States
embassy in Tel Aviv to request a passport for her infant son.259
Zivotofsky’s mother indicated to embassy officials that she wished
her son’s place of birth to be listed on the passport as “Jerusalem,
Israel.”260 Embassy personnel explained that, according to United
States Department of State policy, the passport would list only
“Jerusalem” as Zivotofsky’s place of birth.261 Zivotofsky’s parents
were dissatisfied with this response and sued in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking to
enforce section 214(d) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act
in which Congress allowed citizens born in Jerusalem to list their
place of birth as Israel.262 The district court dismissed the case
on two grounds: first, finding that Zivotofsky lacked standing,
and second, that the case presented a political question that the
court could not resolve.263 Zivotofsky appealed and the D.C.
Circuit reversed the district court on the standing issue, but
affirmed that the issue was a political question.264 The Supreme
256
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Court disagreed with the D.C. Circuit regarding the political
question doctrine, and remanded the case to the D.C. Circuit for
a decision on the merits.265 The D.C. Circuit determined that the
statute was unconstitutional as it impeded the President’s ability
to “recognize a foreign sovereign.”266
The case was appealed to the Supreme Court for a second
time, with the Court this time affirming the D.C. Circuit.267
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, began the Court’s
analysis by moving from a strict constitutional textualism to an
implicit recognition of presidential power, along with a functional
consideration of the relationship between Congress and the President. In Zivotofsky, the Court noted “the Nation must have a single policy regarding which governments are legitimate in the
eyes of the United States and which are not.”268 In support of
this statement, the Court reasoned that the President is best situated to engage in “decisive, unequivocal action necessary to recognize other states at international law.”269 The Court justified
this conclusion based on the Framers designating the President
with “the traditional avenues of recognition—receiving ambassadors, making treaties, and sending ambassadors.”270 As one commentator noted, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion embraced the
tenet that the “President’s exclusive power to recognize states and
governments is a practical function of constitutional structure.” 271
While Justice Kennedy blessed this executive authority with
one hand, he did provide some limits with the other hand. The
majority emphasized that the language in Curtiss-Wright, that
“[t]he President is the sole organ of the nation in its external
relations,” was dicta and that it does not govern the relationship
between Congress and the President with respect to diplomatic
relations.272 Specifically, while the “President does have a unique
role in communicating with foreign governments . . . it is still the
Legislative Branch, not the Executive Branch, that makes the
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law.”273 “The Executive is not free from the ordinary controls and
checks of Congress merely because foreign affairs are at issue.”274
But “[e]ven as [Justice Kennedy] buries Justice Sutherland’s
famous functionalist pro-President dicta in Curtiss-Wright,
Justice Kennedy revealed himself Sutherland’s true heir,
embracing the logic and tropes that defined Sutherland-authored
opinions in Curtiss-Wright and [United States v.] Belmont.”275
Kennedy indicated that “the Nation must have a single policy
regarding which governments are legitimate in the eyes of the
United States.”276 Further, “the Nation must ‘speak . . . with one
voice,’ ” with the President “engaging in . . . delicate and often
secret diplomatic contacts.”277
Equally important in understanding the Zivotofsky decision
is historical gloss. “Historical practice often plays a significant
role in assessments of the Constitution’s distribution of authority
among the three federal branches of government, especially in
the area of foreign affairs.”278 While it is uncertain that the recognition power was historically reserved to the Executive because
Congress accepted exclusive presidential authority or because
Congress had simply not disagreed with the exercise of executive
authority,279 the Zivotofsky Court noted that “it is appropriate to
turn to accepted understandings and practice” and that “on
balance [history] provides strong support for the conclusion that
the recognition power is the President’s alone.”280 Thus, historical gloss is especially relevant to determinations of presidential
power. When authority is uncertain, “[t]he longstanding ‘practice
of the government’ can inform [the Court’s] determination of
‘what the law is’ ” in a separation-of-powers case.281
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V. COURTS SHOULD DEFER TO THE EXECUTIVE IN
DETERMINING AN ADEQUATE AVAILABLE FORUM
UNDER SEPARATION OF POWERS
“In no cases do the courts of this country defer to executive
suggestions as often and as fully as in those having international
ramifications.”282 As evident from recent Supreme Court decisions,
the Court places great weight on the United States government
speaking “with only one voice” when it involves the national
interest.283 This role often fell to the United States Department
of State as an obligation “to give the courts clear statements of
the views of the political departments.”284
For instance, the State Department historically was instrumental in setting forth the Executive’s position with respect to
sovereign immunity, to which the courts would grant almost
complete deference. Foreign sovereign immunity is a well-established principle of both United States and international law. One
of the first statements by the United States Supreme Court
regarding this doctrine occurred in The Schooner Exchange v.
McFaddon, where the Supreme Court relied on international law
and territorial sovereignty to hold that a French vessel was
immune from the jurisdiction of United States courts.285 This
absolute theory of sovereign immunity granted foreign states
immunity with respect to any activity, be it governmental or
commercial, and courts routinely applied it throughout the
nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries.
Eventually, the United States Department of State began to
take a more directed role in whether the doctrine of foreign
sovereign immunity was applicable. The Department of State,
through a letter drafted by Jack Tate, the State Department
Acting Legal Adviser, adopted the “restrictive theory” of foreign
sovereign immunity, by which foreign countries retained sovereign immunity for public or governmental acts, but did not enjoy
immunity with respect to private or commercial acts.286 Courts
then began to defer to positions taken by the Department of State
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regarding whether or not immunity should be granted to a foreign government. The State Department developed a process by
which it would make initial decisions about immunity. If the State
Department decided immunity was appropriate, it would submit
a “suggestion of immunity” to the court.287
The Executive was well within its constitutional prerogatives
to provide suggestions of immunity to the courts regarding
foreign sovereigns. Courts would often defer to the executive
branch as the branch of government best suited to provide
guidance on foreign policy issues. Additionally, Courts would
routinely request and receive executive statements of interest
supporting or denying application of sovereign immunity until
Congress acted through passage of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, thereby removing the Executive’s discretion in
this area and vesting the determination as to sovereign immunity and its exceptions in the courts.288 Through this legislation, Congress implemented the restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity and transferred from the Executive to the judiciary the
responsibility for making the determination of sovereign immunity.289 Again, acting under its constitutional authority, Congress
has acted to limit executive power in the area of foreign affairs
and provide statutory guidance to the courts as to how sovereign
immunity should attach to governmental actions.290
Even though Congress has acted with respect to foreign
sovereign immunity, with regard to determinations regarding the
act of state doctrine, Congress has not intervened in a similar
fashion. Courts will still solicit statements of interest from the
State Department and may defer to executive pronouncements
regarding an act of state. Likewise, Congress has not acted with
any statutory decree with respect to forum non conveniens or
determinations regarding the alternative available forum. As
Congress has not disapproved, the President may take action in a
287
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“zone of twilight” where constitutional authority is not explicit,
but rather, where implied authority to act is found. Absent any
specific congressional intervention in this area of forum non
conveniens decisions, the executive branch should opine on those
cases that directly impact international comity or national policy,
to which the courts should grant extreme deference.
A number of reasons exist to support the conclusion that
courts are not the institution that should make the decisions as to
what qualifies as an alternative available forum. Due to the burden
of proof standard that the courts have devised for demonstrating
the alternative available forum, the court’s decision often simply
becomes a rubber stamp of the defendant’s argument that the
available forum is adequate. Once the defendant asserts that the
forum is available and adequate, this minimal showing often
shifts the burden to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the forum is
either not available, not adequate, or both. Some courts seem to
apply a more rigorous standard for the plaintiff to prove that the
forum is inadequate, especially once the defendant has made a
prima facie showing that the forum is available and adequate.
This higher barrier, whether implicit or explicit, which often
cannot be met by the plaintiff, could be mitigated with
statements of interest from the Executive when the issue
regarding the adequacy of the forum involves international
policy, such as corruption in the foreign government or political
stability. Some courts have given little weight to a plaintiff’s evidence regarding the adequacy of the forum. For instance, in
Tuazon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., the court found that the
evidence of plaintiff’s personal experience testimony regarding
corruption and judicial bias and State Department reports
regarding human right abuses offered by the plaintiff did not
overcome the defendant’s arguments that the Philippines was an
adequate available forum.291 If the executive branch opined more
directly, however, courts could give greater weight to such
statements when the question before the courts affects foreign
policy or international comity.
When the court deliberates on these questions, whether for
reasons of judicial economy or based on the parties’ shifting burdens
of proof, it flies in the face of executive prerogative with respect
to foreign relations. As posited by Professor Donald Childress in
his article “Forum Conveniens: The Search for a Convenient
291
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Forum in Transnational Cases” with respect to comity and executive prerogative, “is there a risk that transnational litigation
enmeshes [United States] courts in questions of foreign policy
and threatens the sovereignty of foreign nations?”292 The simple
answer is yes when separation of powers doctrine provides that
the courts should defer to the Executive when making decisions
that implicate foreign policy, especially when Congress has not
spoken on the issue.
So, when should the courts defer to the Executive under the
separation of powers doctrine in determining the alternative
available forum when Congress has not legislated? Not every
forum non conveniens case that involves a discussion of alternative available forum implicates foreign policy at a level that
requires a separation of powers analysis. When the alternative
available forum is a procedural question or a previously litigated
judicial question, the court is ideally situated to weigh and
balance the parties’ evidence and ultimately opine on whether the
foreign forum is available and adequate. For instance, in
Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co. v. Thyssen Mining Construction of
Canada, Ltd., the court found that Canada was not an adequate
available forum because the statute of limitations had run under
Canadian law.293 Procedural determinations regarding statutes of
limitations or collateral estoppel and res judicata in foreign forums are within the ambit of the judiciary and do not impinge
upon the executive prerogative that surrounds sensitive calculations regarding foreign policy. Thus, courts should determine the
adequacy of the available forum in these circumstances and not
defer to the Executive, as foreign policy considerations are not
implicated.
However, when the issue that affects the determination of
either adequacy or availability of a foreign forum implicates
distinct foreign relations with the foreign country such that it
involves civil liberties, corruption, measures of political rights,
government effectiveness, or political instability in the foreign
forum, the Executive is in the unique position to determine
whether an adequate forum exists. Congress has not legislated
in this area so the Executive may engage in this “zone of
twilight.” Here, the federal government should have a single
policy regarding which governments are legitimate in the eyes of
292
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the United States. Courts are not properly disposed to decide these
issues of foreign policy and may create potential problems when
rendering decisions that may influence sensitive foreign policy
objectives. The court in Carijano, in determining whether Peruvian courts were corrupt, indicated as much by stating that its
analysis hinged on averting “unnecessary indictments by our
judges condemning the sufficiency of the courts and legal
methods of other nations.”294 Thus, the Ninth Circuit ruled that
Peru was an adequate available forum despite expert testimony
that demonstrated that the Peruvian judiciary suffered from
“ ‘institutionalized’ corruption, including widespread lobbying of
judges, third party informal ‘intermediaries’ between magistrates
and parties, and the exchange of improper favors and information.”295 When assessing the adequacy of the forum resulting
from allegations of judicial corruption, courts require a “powerful
showing” with specific evidence, but are not requesting statements
of interests from the Executive prior to making decisions that go
to the core of foreign relations with a foreign government.296 As
such, courts are “impermissibly interfer[ing] with the President’s
[ability] to conduct the Nation’s foreign affairs.”297 This level of
“interference” in foreign policy should never occur, as the constitutional scheme does not allow it.
So why is it important that the judicial branch defer to the
executive branch in determining whether an adequate available
forum exists in a forum non conveniens case between private
litigants? A serious foreign policy breach may develop if the courts
do not provide deference to the Executive and instead overstep
constitutional bounds and interfere with foreign policy. Such interference would render meaningless the determinations of the
Executive in an arena oft reserved to it and would be done at the
expense of a coequal branch of government—a branch of the
government ill-suited for performing such a critical foreign policy
analysis. Courts are extremely reluctant to review a foreign forum
judicial system’s independence, reliability, and ability, as is evident
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from the decisions in the Second and Eleventh Circuit.298 Relying
on “considerations of comity,” courts avoid judging a foreign
justice system so as not to offend a foreign nation. This reluctance to engage in policy conversations that touch upon foreign
relations is exactly why the judiciary should defer to the
Executive in these situations.
When the determination regarding the forum centers on political considerations such as governmental corruption or political
instability, the evidence that the courts need to examine in order
to determine the adequacy of the forum from a foreign policy
perspective is often not readily accessible to the parties or the
court. That information is in the province of the executive branch
that is constitutionally placed to weigh in on such issues through
statements of interest. The court can then make fully informed
decisions about the adequacy of a forum without relying on the
adversarial nature of litigation to provide information that is
critical to the decision and could ultimately affect foreign policy.
CONCLUSION
The arena of foreign relations policy is fraught with political
landmines that are often best navigated by an Executive who
“speaks with one voice” for the nation. While most forum non
conveniens decisions are not controversial with respect to the
issue of an adequate available forum, the occasional case will dip
into territory best left to those who are responsible for safeguarding
international relations. Courts are well positioned to determine
the adequacy of foreign forums when the legal question regarding
adequacy centers on procedural issues or easily decided questions
of law. However, when the issue regarding the adequacy of the
forum centers on governmental corruption, political instability,
political rights, or civil liberties, it is not in the court’s interest to
make this determination, as it does not have the institutional capability to undertake the full analysis. The conversation should
be a multi-branch conversation, with the Executive providing a
statement of interest to the court as to the advisability and
feasibility of a fair and full hearing in the foreign forum. This
executive intervention may exist on a sliding scale—the more
political and governmental legitimacy that the foreign forum
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possesses, the more latitude the court may exercise in receiving
information; the less political and governmental stability, the
more likely the court is to defer to the Executive’s statement.
Such deference will provide more confidence in the court’s final
decision with respect to the alternative available forum. In this
regard, the Executive would be involved in a narrow slice of cases
where it would act as the gatekeeper. Such a function would act
as a “negative trigger,” such that the courts would not make a
determination that affects these aspects of foreign policy without
input from the Executive. This input rightly recognizes under
separation of power doctrine the legitimacy and competency of
the Executive to declare policy with respect to foreign forums.

